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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2026-09-18 23:09:29 +02:00
Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd, the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set. Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1] Add a SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC option to UNIX sockets to enable more useful handling of LSM denials when receiving SCM_RIGHTS messages: instead of truncating the message at the first blocked fd, keep every fd slot and store the LSM errno in the blocked slot. The socket option is inherited by the child accept() socket if set on the listen() socket. [1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260813162818.149248-4-jkoolstra@xs4all.nl Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
581 lines
13 KiB
C
581 lines
13 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/* scm.c - Socket level control messages processing.
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*
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* Author: Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
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* Alignment and value checking mods by Craig Metz
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sched/user.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/stat.h>
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#include <linux/socket.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/net.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/netdevice.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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#include <uapi/linux/pidfd.h>
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#include <linux/pidfs.h>
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#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/errqueue.h>
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#include <linux/io_uring.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <net/protocol.h>
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#include <linux/skbuff.h>
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#include <net/sock.h>
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#include <net/compat.h>
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#include <net/scm.h>
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#include <net/cls_cgroup.h>
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#include <net/af_unix.h>
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/*
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* Only allow a user to send credentials, that they could set with
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* setu(g)id.
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*/
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static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
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{
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
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kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
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kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
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if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
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return -EINVAL;
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if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
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ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
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((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
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uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) &&
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((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
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gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))) {
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return 0;
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}
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return -EPERM;
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}
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static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
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{
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int *fdp = (int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
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struct scm_fp_list *fpl = *fplp;
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struct file **fpp;
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int i, num;
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num = (cmsg->cmsg_len - sizeof(struct cmsghdr))/sizeof(int);
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if (num <= 0)
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return 0;
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if (num > SCM_MAX_FD)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!fpl)
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{
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fpl = kmalloc_obj(struct scm_fp_list, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
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if (!fpl)
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return -ENOMEM;
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*fplp = fpl;
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fpl->count = 0;
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fpl->count_unix = 0;
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fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
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fpl->user = NULL;
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNIX)
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fpl->inflight = false;
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fpl->dead = false;
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fpl->edges = NULL;
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fpl->vertices);
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#endif
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}
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fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
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if (fpl->count + num > fpl->max)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Verify the descriptors and increment the usage count.
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*/
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for (i=0; i< num; i++)
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{
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int fd = fdp[i];
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struct file *file;
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if (fd < 0 || !(file = fget_raw(fd)))
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return -EBADF;
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/* don't allow io_uring files */
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if (io_is_uring_fops(file)) {
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fput(file);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (unix_get_socket(file))
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fpl->count_unix++;
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*fpp++ = file;
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fpl->count++;
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}
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if (!fpl->user)
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fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
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return num;
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}
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void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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struct scm_fp_list *fpl = scm->fp;
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int i;
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if (fpl) {
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scm->fp = NULL;
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for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
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fput(fpl->fp[i]);
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free_uid(fpl->user);
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kfree(fpl);
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_destroy);
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static inline int scm_replace_pid(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct pid *pid)
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{
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int err;
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/* drop all previous references */
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scm_destroy_cred(scm);
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err = pidfs_register_pid(pid);
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if (unlikely(err))
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return err;
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scm->pid = pid;
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scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
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return 0;
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}
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int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
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{
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const struct proto_ops *ops = READ_ONCE(sock->ops);
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struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
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int err;
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for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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/* Verify that cmsg_len is at least sizeof(struct cmsghdr) */
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/* The first check was omitted in <= 2.2.5. The reasoning was
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that parser checks cmsg_len in any case, so that
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additional check would be work duplication.
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But if cmsg_level is not SOL_SOCKET, we do not check
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for too short ancillary data object at all! Oops.
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OK, let's add it...
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*/
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if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
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goto error;
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if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET)
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continue;
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switch (cmsg->cmsg_type)
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{
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case SCM_RIGHTS:
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if (!ops || ops->family != PF_UNIX)
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goto error;
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err=scm_fp_copy(cmsg, &p->fp);
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if (err<0)
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goto error;
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break;
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case SCM_CREDENTIALS:
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{
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struct ucred creds;
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kuid_t uid;
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kgid_t gid;
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if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
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goto error;
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memcpy(&creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
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err = scm_check_creds(&creds);
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if (err)
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goto error;
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if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != creds.pid) {
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struct pid *pid;
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err = -ESRCH;
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pid = find_get_pid(creds.pid);
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if (!pid)
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goto error;
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/* pass a struct pid reference from
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* find_get_pid() to scm_replace_pid().
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*/
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err = scm_replace_pid(p, pid);
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if (err) {
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put_pid(pid);
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goto error;
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}
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}
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err = -EINVAL;
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uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), creds.uid);
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gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), creds.gid);
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if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
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goto error;
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p->creds.uid = uid;
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p->creds.gid = gid;
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break;
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}
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default:
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goto error;
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}
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}
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if (p->fp && !p->fp->count)
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{
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kfree(p->fp);
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p->fp = NULL;
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}
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return 0;
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error:
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scm_destroy(p);
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return err;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_send);
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int put_cmsg(struct msghdr * msg, int level, int type, int len, void *data)
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{
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int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(len);
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if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
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return put_cmsg_compat(msg, level, type, len, data);
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if (!msg->msg_control || msg->msg_controllen < sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
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msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
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return 0; /* XXX: return error? check spec. */
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}
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if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) {
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msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
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cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
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}
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if (msg->msg_control_is_user) {
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struct cmsghdr __user *cm = msg->msg_control_user;
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check_object_size(data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm), true);
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scoped_user_write_access_size(cm, cmlen, efault) {
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unsafe_put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len, efault);
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unsafe_put_user(level, &cm->cmsg_level, efault);
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unsafe_put_user(type, &cm->cmsg_type, efault);
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unsafe_copy_to_user(CMSG_USER_DATA(cm), data,
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cmlen - sizeof(*cm), efault);
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}
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} else {
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struct cmsghdr *cm = msg->msg_control;
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cm->cmsg_level = level;
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cm->cmsg_type = type;
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cm->cmsg_len = cmlen;
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memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cm), data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm));
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}
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cmlen = min(CMSG_SPACE(len), msg->msg_controllen);
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if (msg->msg_control_is_user)
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msg->msg_control_user += cmlen;
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else
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msg->msg_control += cmlen;
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msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
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return 0;
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efault:
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg);
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int put_cmsg_notrunc(struct msghdr *msg, int level, int type, int len,
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void *data)
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{
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/* Don't produce truncated CMSGs */
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if (!msg->msg_control || msg->msg_controllen < CMSG_LEN(len))
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return -ETOOSMALL;
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return put_cmsg(msg, level, type, len, data);
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}
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void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal)
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{
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struct scm_timestamping64 tss;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tss.ts); i++) {
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struct timespec64 tv = ktime_to_timespec64(tss_internal->ts[i]);
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tss.ts[i].tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
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tss.ts[i].tv_nsec = tv.tv_nsec;
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}
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW, sizeof(tss), &tss);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64);
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void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal)
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{
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struct scm_timestamping tss;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tss.ts); i++) {
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struct timespec64 tv = ktime_to_timespec64(tss_internal->ts[i]);
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tss.ts[i].tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
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tss.ts[i].tv_nsec = tv.tv_nsec;
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}
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING_OLD, sizeof(tss), &tss);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg_scm_timestamping);
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static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg)
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{
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if (msg->msg_controllen <= sizeof(struct cmsghdr))
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return 0;
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return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
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}
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int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd, unsigned int flags,
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bool notrunc)
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{
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int error;
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if (!ufd)
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return -EFAULT;
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error = security_file_receive(f);
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if (error)
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return notrunc ? put_user(error, ufd) : error;
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FD_PREPARE(fdf, flags, get_file(f));
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if (fdf.err)
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return fdf.err;
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error = put_user(fd_prepare_fd(fdf), ufd);
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if (error)
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return error;
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__receive_sock(fd_prepare_file(fdf));
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return fd_publish(fdf);
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}
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void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc)
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{
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struct cmsghdr __user *cm =
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(__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
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unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0;
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int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds(msg), scm->fp->count);
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int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_USER_DATA(cm);
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int err = 0, i;
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/* no use for FD passing from kernel space callers */
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!msg->msg_control_is_user))
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return;
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if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) {
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scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm, notrunc);
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return;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
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err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, notrunc);
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if (err < 0)
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break;
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}
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if (i > 0) {
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int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));
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err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
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if (!err)
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err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
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if (!err)
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err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
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if (!err) {
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cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));
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if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
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cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
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msg->msg_control_user += cmlen;
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msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
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}
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}
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if (i < scm->fp->count || (scm->fp->count && fdmax <= 0))
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msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
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/*
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* All of the files that fit in the message have had their usage counts
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* incremented, so we just free the list.
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*/
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__scm_destroy(scm);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_detach_fds);
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struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
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{
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struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl;
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int i;
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if (!fpl)
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return NULL;
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new_fpl = kmemdup(fpl, offsetof(struct scm_fp_list, fp[fpl->count]),
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GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
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if (new_fpl) {
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for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
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get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
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new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
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new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNIX)
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new_fpl->inflight = false;
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new_fpl->edges = NULL;
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_fpl->vertices);
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#endif
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}
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return new_fpl;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup);
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|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
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static void scm_passec(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
|
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struct lsm_context ctx;
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int err;
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|
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if (sk->sk_scm_security) {
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err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &ctx);
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|
|
if (err >= 0) {
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put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, ctx.len,
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ctx.context);
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|
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security_release_secctx(&ctx);
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}
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}
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}
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|
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static bool scm_has_secdata(struct sock *sk)
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{
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return sk->sk_scm_security;
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}
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#else
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static void scm_passec(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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}
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static bool scm_has_secdata(struct sock *sk)
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{
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return false;
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}
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#endif
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|
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static void scm_pidfd_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
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{
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|
struct file *pidfd_file = NULL;
|
|
int len, pidfd;
|
|
|
|
/* put_cmsg() doesn't return an error if CMSG is truncated,
|
|
* that's why we need to opencode these checks here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
|
|
len = sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
|
|
else
|
|
len = sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
|
|
|
|
if (msg->msg_controllen < len) {
|
|
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!scm->pid)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
pidfd = pidfd_prepare(scm->pid, PIDFD_STALE, &pidfd_file);
|
|
|
|
if (put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_PIDFD, sizeof(int), &pidfd)) {
|
|
if (pidfd_file) {
|
|
put_unused_fd(pidfd);
|
|
fput(pidfd_file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pidfd_file)
|
|
fd_install(pidfd, pidfd_file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool __scm_recv_common(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
|
|
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!msg->msg_control) {
|
|
if (sk->sk_scm_credentials || sk->sk_scm_pidfd ||
|
|
scm->fp || scm_has_secdata(sk))
|
|
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
|
|
|
|
scm_destroy(scm);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sk->sk_scm_credentials) {
|
|
struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
|
|
struct ucred ucreds = {
|
|
.pid = scm->creds.pid,
|
|
.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
|
|
.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scm_passec(sk, msg, scm);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
|
|
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!__scm_recv_common(sock->sk, msg, scm, flags))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
scm_destroy_cred(scm);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_recv);
|
|
|
|
void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
|
|
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!__scm_recv_common(sock->sk, msg, scm, flags))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (scm->fp) {
|
|
struct unix_sock *u;
|
|
|
|
u = unix_sk(sock->sk);
|
|
scm_detach_fds(msg, scm, READ_ONCE(u->scm_rights_notrunc));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sock->sk->sk_scm_pidfd)
|
|
scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
|
|
|
|
scm_destroy_cred(scm);
|
|
}
|