Files
linux/crypto/algif_hash.c
T
Eric Biggers 2f204fe718 crypto: af_alg - Add af_alg_restrict sysctl, defaulting to 1
AF_ALG is a frequent source of vulnerabilities and a maintenance
nightmare.  It exposes far more functionality to userspace than ever
should have been exposed, especially to unprivileged processes.  Recent
exploits have targeted kernel internal implementation details like
"authencesn" that have zero use case for userspace access.

Fortunately, AF_ALG is rarely used in practice, as userspace crypto
libraries exist.  And when it is used, only some functionality is known
to be used, and many users are known to hold capabilities already.
iwd for example requires CAP_NET_ADMIN and has a known algorithm list
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/bcbbef00-5881-421b-8892-7be6c04b832d@gmail.com/).

Thus, let's restrict the set of allowed algorithms by default, depending
on the capabilities held.

Add a sysctl /proc/sys/crypto/af_alg_restrict with meaning:

    0: unrestricted
    1: limited functionality
    2: completely disabled

Set the default value to 1, which enables an algorithm allowlist for
unprivileged processes and a slightly longer allowlist for privileged
processes.

Note that the list may be tweaked in the future.  However, the common
use cases such as iwd and bluez are taken into account already.  I've
tested that iwd still works with the default value of 1.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2026-07-05 13:27:15 +08:00

495 lines
10 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* algif_hash: User-space interface for hash algorithms
*
* This file provides the user-space API for hash algorithms.
*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
*/
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
static const struct af_alg_allowlist_entry hash_allowlist[] = {
{ "cmac(aes)", true }, /* iwd, bluez */
{ "hmac(md5)", true }, /* iwd */
{ "hmac(sha1)", true }, /* iwd */
{ "hmac(sha224)", true }, /* iwd */
{ "hmac(sha256)", true }, /* iwd */
{ "hmac(sha384)", true }, /* iwd */
{ "hmac(sha512)", true }, /* iwd, sha512hmac */
{ "md4", true }, /* iwd */
{ "md5", true }, /* iwd */
{ "sha1", false }, /* iwd, iproute2 < 7.0 */
{ "sha224", true }, /* iwd */
{ "sha256", true }, /* iwd */
{ "sha384", true }, /* iwd */
{ "sha512", true }, /* iwd */
{},
};
struct hash_ctx {
struct af_alg_sgl sgl;
u8 *result;
struct crypto_wait wait;
unsigned int len;
bool more;
struct ahash_request req;
};
static int hash_alloc_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx)
{
unsigned ds;
if (ctx->result)
return 0;
ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
ctx->result = sock_kmalloc(sk, ds, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->result)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(ctx->result, 0, ds);
return 0;
}
static void hash_free_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx)
{
unsigned ds;
if (!ctx->result)
return;
ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->result, ds);
ctx->result = NULL;
}
static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t ignored)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
ssize_t copied = 0;
size_t len, max_pages, npages;
bool continuing, need_init = false;
int err;
max_pages = min_t(size_t, ALG_MAX_PAGES,
DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE));
lock_sock(sk);
continuing = ctx->more;
if (!continuing) {
/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
if (!msg_data_left(msg))
goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */
need_init = true;
} else if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
/*
* No data - finalise the prev req if MSG_MORE so any error
* comes out here.
*/
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
goto unlock_free_result;
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL,
ctx->result, 0);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock_free_result;
}
goto done_more;
}
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
ctx->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0;
err = -EIO;
npages = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter, max_pages);
if (npages == 0)
goto unlock_free;
sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
err = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, LONG_MAX,
&ctx->sgl.sgt, npages, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto unlock_free;
len = err;
sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents - 1);
if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
}
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl,
ctx->result, len);
if (!msg_data_left(msg) && !continuing &&
!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
err = crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->req);
} else {
if (need_init) {
err = crypto_wait_req(
crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
need_init = false;
}
if (msg_data_left(msg) || (msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req);
else
err = crypto_ahash_finup(&ctx->req);
continuing = true;
}
err = crypto_wait_req(err, &ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock_free;
copied += len;
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
}
done_more:
ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
done:
err = 0;
unlock:
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
unlock_free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
unlock_free_result:
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
ctx->more = false;
goto unlock;
}
static int hash_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
bool result;
int err;
if (len > ds)
len = ds;
else if (len < ds)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
lock_sock(sk);
result = ctx->result;
err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
if (err)
goto unlock;
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0);
if (!result && !ctx->more) {
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
if (!result || ctx->more) {
ctx->more = false;
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
&ctx->wait);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
err = memcpy_to_msg(msg, ctx->result, len);
unlock:
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
release_sock(sk);
return err ?: len;
}
static int hash_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock,
struct proto_accept_arg *arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct ahash_request *req = &ctx->req;
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
struct sock *sk2;
struct alg_sock *ask2;
struct hash_ctx *ctx2;
char *state;
bool more;
int err;
tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
state = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!state)
goto out;
lock_sock(sk);
more = ctx->more;
err = more ? crypto_ahash_export(req, state) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
if (err)
goto out_free_state;
err = af_alg_accept(ask->parent, newsock, arg);
if (err)
goto out_free_state;
sk2 = newsock->sk;
ask2 = alg_sk(sk2);
ctx2 = ask2->private;
ctx2->more = more;
if (!more)
goto out_free_state;
err = crypto_ahash_import(&ctx2->req, state);
out_free_state:
kfree_sensitive(state);
out:
return err;
}
static struct proto_ops algif_hash_ops = {
.family = PF_ALG,
.connect = sock_no_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.getname = sock_no_getname,
.ioctl = sock_no_ioctl,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.bind = sock_no_bind,
.release = af_alg_release,
.sendmsg = hash_sendmsg,
.recvmsg = hash_recvmsg,
.accept = hash_accept,
};
static int hash_check_key(struct socket *sock)
{
int err = 0;
struct sock *psk;
struct alg_sock *pask;
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (!atomic_read(&ask->nokey_refcnt))
goto unlock_child;
psk = ask->parent;
pask = alg_sk(ask->parent);
tfm = pask->private;
err = -ENOKEY;
lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
goto unlock;
atomic_dec(&pask->nokey_refcnt);
atomic_set(&ask->nokey_refcnt, 0);
err = 0;
unlock:
release_sock(psk);
unlock_child:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static int hash_sendmsg_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size)
{
int err;
err = hash_check_key(sock);
if (err)
return err;
return hash_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
}
static int hash_recvmsg_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t ignored, int flags)
{
int err;
err = hash_check_key(sock);
if (err)
return err;
return hash_recvmsg(sock, msg, ignored, flags);
}
static int hash_accept_nokey(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock,
struct proto_accept_arg *arg)
{
int err;
err = hash_check_key(sock);
if (err)
return err;
return hash_accept(sock, newsock, arg);
}
static struct proto_ops algif_hash_ops_nokey = {
.family = PF_ALG,
.connect = sock_no_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.getname = sock_no_getname,
.ioctl = sock_no_ioctl,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.bind = sock_no_bind,
.release = af_alg_release,
.sendmsg = hash_sendmsg_nokey,
.recvmsg = hash_recvmsg_nokey,
.accept = hash_accept_nokey,
};
static void *hash_bind(const char *name)
{
int err;
err = af_alg_check_restriction(name, hash_allowlist);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
return crypto_alloc_ahash(name, 0, AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK);
}
static void hash_release(void *private)
{
crypto_free_ahash(private);
}
static int hash_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
return crypto_ahash_setkey(private, key, keylen);
}
static void hash_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
af_alg_release_parent(sk);
}
static int hash_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = private;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx;
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(ctx, 0, len);
ctx->len = len;
crypto_init_wait(&ctx->wait);
ask->private = ctx;
ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, tfm);
ahash_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &ctx->wait);
sk->sk_destruct = hash_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
static int hash_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = private;
if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
return -ENOKEY;
return hash_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk);
}
static const struct af_alg_type algif_type_hash = {
.bind = hash_bind,
.release = hash_release,
.setkey = hash_setkey,
.accept = hash_accept_parent,
.accept_nokey = hash_accept_parent_nokey,
.ops = &algif_hash_ops,
.ops_nokey = &algif_hash_ops_nokey,
.name = "hash",
.owner = THIS_MODULE
};
static int __init algif_hash_init(void)
{
return af_alg_register_type(&algif_type_hash);
}
static void __exit algif_hash_exit(void)
{
int err = af_alg_unregister_type(&algif_type_hash);
BUG_ON(err);
}
module_init(algif_hash_init);
module_exit(algif_hash_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Userspace interface for hash algorithms");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");