fscrypt: Remove workaround for bug in gcc 7 and earlier

Since the kernel's minimum gcc version is now 8.1, the workaround for a
strange gcc bug in fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() is no longer needed.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619051008.51223-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers
2026-07-20 10:39:25 -07:00
parent 928a1e6ba3
commit dbca129025
+2 -15
View File
@@ -507,7 +507,6 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
union fscrypt_policy policy;
union fscrypt_policy existing_policy;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
u8 version;
int size;
int ret;
@@ -518,21 +517,9 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
if (size <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* We should just copy the remaining 'size - 1' bytes here, but a
* bizarre bug in gcc 7 and earlier (fixed by gcc r255731) causes gcc to
* think that size can be 0 here (despite the check above!) *and* that
* it's a compile-time constant. Thus it would think copy_from_user()
* is passed compile-time constant ULONG_MAX, causing the compile-time
* buffer overflow check to fail, breaking the build. This only occurred
* when building an i386 kernel with -Os and branch profiling enabled.
*
* Work around it by just copying the first byte again...
*/
version = policy.version;
if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, size))
if (copy_from_user((u8 *)&policy + 1, (const u8 __user *)arg + 1,
size - 1))
return -EFAULT;
policy.version = version;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode))
return -EACCES;